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Paul F. Diehl is the Henning Larsen Professor of political science at Illinois. His areas of expertise include quantitative analyses of international conflict, UN peacekeeping operations, geopolitics, and international law. Professor Diehl is the director of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Teaching Academy. He is also director of the Correlates of War Project, the largest data collection project on international conflict in the world. Here, he discusses the future of U.S. foreign policy under a new president.
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Clearly, the next president, whether it is Sen. Barack Obama or Sen. John McCain, will have a number of different foreign policy issues to address. But the first topic almost certainly would be troop involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. How do you foresee each of the candidates handling this issue? Over time, the positions of the two candidates on Iraq have become more convergent as the situation on the ground has become more convergent. Senator Obama no longer speaks about beginning troop withdrawals on the first day of his presidency and Senator McCain is more circumspect about keeping troops in place for an unlimited period of time. The candidates’ actual policies will differ more in terms of the pace of withdrawal and are likely to be governed more by changes in Iraq (e.g., increased violence, better functioning national army) than their previous campaign rhetoric. The range of choice could also be narrowed by an agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi governments on a framework for withdrawal, something that almost came to fruition this past summer. Afghanistan may become the “new Iraq” as the violence increases and government structures break down. Senator Obama has indicated that he favors increasing American troop presence by 10,000, transferring troops from the Iraqi theater to Afghanistan. Senator McCain has indicated he favors the same strategy that was successful in Iraq. This presumably means a troop surge, although he has not specified the number of troops this might involve or how long they might be deployed. The “War on Terror” has led many to look at Pakistan as a likely haven for many groups wishing to harm the U.S. How likely is a prolonged military operation in Pakistan, and how prominent has each candidate made this issue? A great deal of criticism has been directed against Senator Obama for his statements about using military force within Pakistani borders without the permission of the host government. Yet his professed policy lists a number of narrow conditions for such actions, often dealing the politically popular goal of killing Osama bin Laden. Senator McCain would not necessarily pursue a different policy, but has indicated that publicly stating one’s intentions is a diplomatic blunder. Indeed, President Bush has already authorized covert and overt military actions across the border into Afghanistan, but none of these are extensive or prolonged and this is unlikely to change with a new president. Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan are obvious situations to which the new President will have to look for solutions. What are some other topics that are sure to be atop his agenda, and why? There are likely to be several continuing issues on the foreign policy agenda of the new president, largely dictated by external events. Broadly, the United States needs to construct a strategy on how to interact with Russia, whether as a partner or an enemy; this may vary across the wide variety of issues (e.g., trade, security, human rights) that will arise. Addressing nuclear proliferation challenges from North Korea and Iran will also merit attention. Past agreements have largely failed to address those threats, and the new president will need to decide what mixture of multilateral diplomacy, unilateral initiatives, and military coercion will be necessary. Finally, domestic economic pressures stemming from a recession may lead the new president to take a more protectionist stance on trade broadly, and NAFTA or other hemispheric initiatives in particular. In contrast, to the major issues, and number of other situations could perhaps draw less attention, such as African conflicts or the U.S. relationship with socialist Latin American regimes. What do you think it will take for Obama or McCain to seek to increase political engagement in these areas? What are some other issues that may be given lower precedence? Presidents are limited in how many priorities can be tackled at once, and domestic economic woes from the financial crisis are likely to dominate executive and Congressional attention for at least 2009. Assuming that events in Africa or Latin America do not possess significant threats to U.S. interests, it is unlikely that will be placed high on the new president’s agenda. Furthermore, a traditional foreign policy focus – the Arab-Israeli conflict – is also unlikely to prompt new American peace initiatives, given prospective changes in the Israeli government and the continuing divide between Palestinian factions. |
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Professor Richard Tempest Discusses the Recent Conflict in Georgia
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Richard Tempest is the director of the Russian, East European and Eurasian Center at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and an associate professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, where he was acting head in 2006-07 and 2000-02. His research interests lie in the area of Russian culture, history, and politics and their intersection with disciplines such as the history of religion, cultural theory, and the semiotics of the body. He also writes on Bulgarian history and culture. Here he discusses the recent conflict in Georgia and its causes and effects. |
On August 7, the Georgian military attacked separatists in the Georgian-region South Ossetia. Consequently, Russian military forces entered Georgia in support of the separatist regions. What was the root cause of the uprising? Why did the Russian military become involved? Under the Soviet Union, Ossetia was divided into two administrative units, North Ossetia, which was part of Russia, and South Ossetia, which was part of Georgia. As the Soviet Union began to implode in the early 1990s, South Ossetia became the scene of armed conflict between Georgian forces and South Ossetian separatists who wished to unite with their counterparts in North Ossetia. The conflict ended in 1992; a ceasefire was signed that provided for the presence in South Ossetia territory of Russian peacekeepers. Russia granted tens of thousands of South Ossetians Russian passports, even though legally the territory they inhabit was (and still is) a part of Georgia. Sporadic violations of the ceasefire by both sides occurred over subsequent years until on the night of August 8, 2008 Georgia tried to occupy South Ossetia by force. By so doing Georgian President Saakashvili played into Russia's hands, since the Russian leadership has long been anxious to assert itself in what is known as the "near abroad," that is, the territories of the former Soviet Union bordering on the Russian Federation. A staunch ally of the United States and an applicant to join NATO, Georgia is regarded by Russian policy makers as a stalking horse for the West in an area they consider part of their country's historical sphere of influence. Russian military intervention in this new conflict was meant to show that after the diplomatic and military defeats of the 1990s, Russia is back. Another factor in the military-diplomatic-economic equation is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which transports Azeri oil to the West and bypasses Russia by running through Georgian territory, thereby constituting an important alternative route for West-bound energy supplies. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was urged by U.S. President George W. Bush during a meeting to cease fire and recognize the territorial integrity of Georgia. What does this meeting and the situation as a whole say about Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's power in the Russian government? What impact could this have on the political climate in Russia? The Georgia-Russia conflict offers conclusive proof that Dmitry Medvedev is not an independent political actor. Indeed, he may safely be described as an extension of Vladimir Putin, his predecessor as president and now Russia's prime minister, even though under the constitution the head of government (Putin) serves at the pleasure of the head of state (Medvedev). The recent events in the Caucasus may well exacerbate nationalistic and even xenophobic sentiments among some Russians (yet, it is ironic that in Moscow and other cities Ossetians have been the victims of racist attacks), while encouraging Russian policy makers to take a tougher line with Ukraine and Moldova, countries with sizeable Russian-speaking minorities. In Moldova the Transdniester region, like South Ossetia a separatist enclave within the territory of this former Soviet republic, has enjoyed Russian protection ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the case of Ukraine, Russia would dearly love to recover the Crimea, a subtropical peninsula where the Russian Black Sea fleet is based. U.S. Presidential candidate John McCain has suggested that Russia be expelled from the G8 group of leading economic powers. How would you characterize the U.S.-Russian relationship in the wake of the Georgian war? John McCain has consistently taken a tough line on Russia; he is also personally close to President Saakashvili. However, should McCain win the presidency, it is far from certain that Russia would be expelled from the G8. Such an action by the major Western powers and Japan would be a humiliation for Russia and would, if anything, exacerbate tensions. It would not moderate Russian behavior in the "near abroad" or elsewhere; quite the contrary. In spite of the recent events in the Caucasus, the United States has economic and political interests in common with Russia. Russian foreign policy today is not driven by a totalitarian ideology but by a mixture of military and economic considerations, feelings of national prestige, as well as a lingering sense of resentment against the West and the United States in particular. All in all, a rather nineteenth-century mix of factors. If the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are granted independence from Georgia, does this set a dangerous precedent for other regions in the former Soviet Union? Are suggestions that many leaders of former Soviet republics are Russian puppets merited? The Russians would argue-have argued-that the precedent was set by the proclamation of Kosovo's independence, which was recognized by the United States and many of its allies. But certainly, a Russian recognition of an independent South Ossetia and Abkhazia-or their incorporation into the Russian Federation-would amount to an abrogation of the post-Soviet territorial settlement and could have highly destabilizing consequences for the region. As for the idea that many of the leaders of the former Soviet republics are merely Russian stooges, I cannot think of a single one who could be so described. Some of them are democratic and some are authoritarian; some are honest and some are corrupt; but none is a puppet of Russia-or of the United States, for that matter.
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Professor Ken Cuno Discusses the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire Pact
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Ken Cuno is a professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research interests include the social history of modern Egypt and the Levant, the family, Islamic and secular law, and the U.S. role in the Middle East. Here, Dr. Cuno discusses the tenuous peace agreement between Israel and Hamas that went into effect June 19. |
What do Israel and Hamas each hope to gain from the cease-fire? Could it lead to progress in the peace process? A year ago, after Hamas seized control of Gaza, Israel closed its borders and imposed an economic embargo. But Israel has been unable to protect its citizens from rocket and mortar fire from Gaza. Therefore, both Israel - the government as well as the people - and Hamas and the Gazan Palestinians could benefit from a period of calm. The cease-fire agreement includes the opening of border crossing points between Gaza and Israel and Egypt to allow more goods to enter Gaza. The two sides are also discussing the release of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit, held by Hamas since 2006, in exchange for several hundred Palestinian prisoners. The U.S. has insisted on isolating Hamas, but now Israel has agreed to a truce brokered by Egypt. Is this a failure for U.S. policy? The hard line against Hamas promoted by the Bush administration has failed. Israel's economic blockade and Israeli air and artillery strikes, albeit in response to rocket and mortar fire from Gaza, could only go so far until the cost in terms of world opinion was too high. And they did not produce the desired results. Palestinian nationalism places a high value on "steadfastness," and so a year of economic and military pressure failed to turn Gazans against Hamas, but rather Hamas solidified its position. If Hamas is serious about the cease-fire why don't they prevent Islamic Jihad and the Aqsa Brigades from firing rockets at Israel? If Israel is serious about the cease-fire, why don't they suspend operations against Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Aqsa Brigades in the West Bank? Hamas is rather opaque. My impression is that the leadership is divided between "ideologues" and "pragmatists" and they have less discipline than an established state like Israel. They may not be able to prevent Islamic Jihad from firing rockets, and they have said they will not use force to prevent it. Hamas may be signaling Israel that Israel cannot act freely against Palestinian militants in the West Bank. The government of Israel has pointed out that the cease fire concerns only Gaza, and moreover there is enormous political pressure to balance the cease fire with continued action elsewhere. Israel responded to the Jihad rockets in late June by re-closing the border crossing points, but Hamas responded to that by suspending the talks on Corporal Shalit. Both sides have to appease their own hard liners while not going over the brink if the cease-fire is to last, but these actions and reactions could cause it to fail. Israel is now dealing with both Mahmoud Abbas, the recognized head of the Palestinian Authority, and the rival Hamas leadership in Gaza. Doesn't that complicate the peace process? Yes, but we should acknowledge two things. First, the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank were already divided before Israel's decision to deal with Hamas. Hamas controls Gaza. If Israel wants something in Gaza--such as an end to the rocket fire and the return of Corporal Shalit--they have to talk to Hamas. Abbas can't deliver either one of those things. Second, what peace process? The Bush administration belatedly promoted talks between the PA and Israel last year. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Abbas have obligingly engaged in talks, but without results. As Israeli wags say, there is a lot of process but little peace. The sadly ironic thing is that for decades we were told that if only the Palestinians accepted Israel and gave up violence there could be progress toward peace, and that is still the official American and Israeli line. But in the decade after the PLO forswore violence and limited its territorial ambitions to the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, occupied by Israel in 1967, Israel doubled the number of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories. Israel continues to expand settlements while Olmert and Abbas talk. So if you were a Palestinian, what lesson would you draw? What are conditions like for the people living in Gaza? Terrible. But for the reasons I already mentioned, there are limits to the misery that Israel can allow itself to be seen to inflict on the Gazan population. The recent flap over the Fulbright grantees briefly exposed the policy of collective punishment through total closure of the borders. But if nothing else changes Israel will probably continue to allow the bare minimum of food, medicine, water, and electricity into Gaza. Supplies are also smuggled into Gaza through tunnels from the Egyptian side of the border. Obviously there is nothing like a normal economy there. As in Lebanon during its civil war, the main employers are the militias. A distorted political-economic situation like this one empowers the militants.
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Professor Gale Summerfield Addresses the Global Food Shortage
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Gale Summerfield is director of the Women and Gender in Global Perspectives Program at Illinois, and is associate professor in Human and Community Development. Her research focuses on gender, development and globalization issues including strategies to improve conditions during economic and financial crises. She has written on gender aspects of reforms in China and other developing countries, risk and international economic crises, transnational migration for care work, and human security. Here, she answers questions about the state of worldwide food security and shortages, as well as the correlation between energy and food prices. |
People from many areas around the world are finding the shortage of food at a level that suggests a crisis. This appears to largely be a byproduct of food costs rising at an astronomical rate. What factors are causing these rising costs, and what role does the growing popularity of biofuels and skyrocketing oil prices play? Several key factors have contributed to the dramatic rise in food prices in the last few months. These include drought in Australia and other environmental problems, a growing population, the rising global demand for animal products such as milk and meat, the rising price of oil increasing farming costs, and the new impact of biofuels production. Rising oil costs contribute to higher food prices in several direct ways, such as the increasing cost of fertilizer, harvesting, and transportation. Indirectly, they have added to the urgency for finding alternative energy sources such as biofuels. The FAO meeting on the food crisis in early June 2008 illustrates that there is much disagreement over the extent that biofuels have contributed to the recent price hikes, from a low of three percent suggested by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to a high of 30 percent suggested by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Food shortages and price increases disproportionately affect areas where poverty is already a great concern. What parts of the world are being hit the hardest, and what can be done to help soften the blow to these people? The poor, especially in developing countries, are hit particularly hard by the rising food prices. As they spend even more of their income on food, they often get less nutritional value and have to skip meals. The world already has at least 850 million people living in poverty and coping with hunger. About 820 million of these people live in developing countries. There have been over 20 demonstrations against the surge in food prices in developing countries around the world, including Haiti, Somalia, Egypt, and Indonesia. Many of the recent demonstrations have been carried out by middle-class people who are being forced into poverty. The World Food Programme (WFP) is the main international organization addressing immediate food relief, but because of the jump in prices, they experienced a large shortfall of approximately $755 million for this year. Many countries, including the U.S., have increased their donations to the WFP to cover the current deficit, but at the same time other aid programs are threatened by the rising costs. The most attractive programs for addressing hunger are those that support rather than destroy local markets. Short-term interventions include food transfers, feeding programs at schools, and public works projects to put more income in the hands of the poor. In the longer term, social safety nets need to be improved, more support needs to go to agriculture, grain funds need to be expanded, and trade issues need to be addressed. Controversial issues of appropriate biofuel subsidies, biotechnology, and removal of trade barriers need to be openly discussed and acted on.
There have been suggestions that these "food crises" have a different effect on women and children as opposed to men. What do you see as being the cause of this gender inequity, and what are some possible solutions? A basic gender difference is related to the impact of poor nutrition during pregnancy and the first few years of life. Inadequate nutrition in these periods can permanently affect people, so that a temporary crisis can lead to long-term capability deprivation. In addition, women and children constitute a majority of the world's poor and are hit the hardest by a crisis, such as the current food crisis. Discrimination against women is widespread. This shows up in fewer opportunities for employment and clustering of women in low-paid jobs; in addition, preference for sons in families, in times of scarcity, results in food and health care deprivation placed first on daughters. Promotion of gender equity requires a broad approach that permeates society, but there are specific steps that can be taken in crisis situations. Providing scholarships equally to girls and boys to keep them in school when crises threaten to disrupt their education can situate them better for long-term economic security. Offering free meals at schools is likely to reach girls better if there is much discrimination at home. Having public works interventions that offer jobs in fields where women often work, such as education, can be an effective short-run program. Involving women at all stages of policy design and implementation is important for equity in the long run.
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