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Bangladeshi Electoral Politics

Matt Rosenstein, Associate Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security responds to questions in light of the cancelled elections in Bangladesh, originally slated for January 22.

What are the chief characteristics of the Bangladeshi electoral system?

In a word: unique. Established as a parliamentary democracy in 1972 after its 1971 secession from Pakistan, the young democracy has had its share of growing pains, including 16 years of military rule. Periodic general elections held since 1991, though largely viewed as free and fair, have typically been marked by varying levels of controversy.

As a mechanism for ensuring free and fair elections, parliament passed a constitutional amendment in 1996 that enacted the current caretaker government system. When an incumbent prime minister and all 300 members of parliament (representing single-seat constituencies) complete their five-year terms simultaneously, the constitution mandates dissolution of parliament and hand-over of executive powers to a neutral, non-party caretaker government, headed by a chief advisor (analogous to a prime minister) and council of advisors. The caretaker government carries out routine government functions while assisting an election commission tasked to hold elections. The constitution stipulates that elections must take place within 90 days of the previous government’s dissolution. After the elections are completed, the caretaker government cedes governing responsibilities to the newly elected representatives.

There has been street violence since the caretaker government took over in October. Why?

As the 2007 elections approached, one of the two major parties, the Awami League (AL), alleged that its rival, the incumbent Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was attempting to rig the polls by populating the caretaker government and election commission with BNP cronies. The AL called for various members of these bodies to be replaced, pressing its demands through street demonstrations. These led to violent confrontations with police and supporters of the BNP. News reports placed the tolls at 45 dead and hundreds injured during months of violence.

In general terms, savvy politicians in Bangladesh have learned that street demonstrations—in the form of transportation blockades and hartals (general strikes)—are an effective means of advancing political aims. The strategy brings the country to a standstill until political grievances are addressed. Unfortunately, this tactic has a huge negative impact on both law and order and on the country’s economy. Estimates vary, but each hartal deters further foreign investment and can cost Bangladesh, already one of the poorest countries of the world, millions of dollars.

The elections slated for January 22nd have been cancelled and a new interim chief advisor sworn in. What do you see as likely internal ramifications of this action?

President Iajuddin Ahmed stepped down from the chief advisor position on January 12, announcing the indefinite deferment of the polls and a state of emergency. These moves were necessary. The January 22 polls were shaping up to be nothing more than a one-sided exercise, given the AL-led multi-party alliance promise to boycott them. They had also appealed to their supporters to resist the polls, which would likely have led to further violence.

Ahmed’s stepping down satisfied one of the AL’s primary grievances. Promises to reconstitute the council of advisors and the election commission, and to revise the list of eligible voters (with possible introduction of voter identification cards) have also appeased the AL. The immediate result was that the AL halted the massive street protests, restoring a measure of calm.

A good deal of uncertainty remains with respect to Bangladesh’s political future. It is uncertain when the elections will be held and how the BNP will respond—will they view themselves as being at a disadvantage now and challenge recent developments with demonstrations of their own? Will the AL and BNP finally be willing to engage in dialogue to arrive at consensus on revised election procedures? How effectively and fairly can the new caretaker government mediate such a dialogue? And, of course, the political elites will at some point have to come to terms with the fact that significant constitutional provisions have been side-stepped since October 2006. The caretaker system failed in many respects and has appeared vulnerable to tampering, so the polity will have to seriously reassess its efficacy and consider possible improvements.

What are the security implications for the South Asia if the election doesn’t go forward?

In the short term, major noticeable effects on regional security are unlikely, but either of two potential scenarios, if set in motion, could affect regional security.

First, a military coup could occur. Even prior to the declaration on January 12 of a state of emergency, the army was deployed throughout the country to enforce law and order. It remains deployed, with broad powers to arrest without warrants. The country has experienced over 20 military coup attempts since its 1971 independence (some successful), so this is a clear concern that could have implications for regional stability.

A second scenario involves the toppling of Bangladesh’s representative democracy by fundamentalist Islamist forces, comparable to Afghanistan’s Taliban. Powerful Islamist elements exist and want to see current democratic institutions supplanted by more authoritarian ones based on their interpretations of Islamic law. This scenario could be highly destabilizing, but remains a distant threat as long as Bangladesh’s numerous and well-established “secularists” continue their efforts to preserve and enhance the country’s democracy.

Inevitably, anything that destabilizes the region brings with it the shadow of the contentious rivalry between India and Pakistan, which both have vested interests in the country’s fate. In simple terms, India wants to see Bangladesh succeed as a democracy. Pakistan embraces Bangladesh’s Muslim identity. Each values Bangladesh’s possible role as an ally against the other. Still, given the nuclear weapons they’ve trained at each other, both India and Pakistan would be very careful not to let domestic Bangladeshi politics pull them into a regional conflict. Conceivably, the situation could temporarily strain or derail the ongoing India-Pakistan peace process, but we are currently quite far from such tensions materializing over the electoral crisis.

The EU and United Nations announced that they are suspending election observer missions. What will it take to have the observers return?

Most analysts view these announcements as a turning point in Bangladesh’s political crisis. Once the international community made clear it would not consider the January 22 polls legitimate, political leaders were forced to pull back. As major donor organizations, institutions like the EU and the UN have tremendous influence in Bangladesh. It rankles many Bangladeshis that international interests have such influence, but that economic—and political—reality will only change once the country has acquired sufficient economic strength.

For the election observers to return, they will need assurance that relatively free, fair, and, if possible, peaceful elections will take place, with broad participation from candidates in all major political parties. It will take time (indications are that it may be at least six more months before polls are held) but members of Bangladesh’s civil society appear determined to get things right. The most important thing, though, is for the Bangladeshi people to participate meaningfully in their domestic politics and know that their votes are being counted and respected.

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This page contains a single interview from Global Viewpoint posted on January 22, 2007 2:56 PM.

The previous interview was Mid-term Elections: International Implications.

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