To the surprise of no one, Dmitri Medvedev, the chairman of the board of Gazprom and Putin's long time protege, was elected president of Russia on March 2 with more than 70 percent of the vote. Some of his statements have inspired hope. He has spoken, for example, of the need to overcome Russia's "legal nihilism." But whether he really wants to or indeed can do anything about Russia's greatest problem- its underlying lawlessness - remains far from clear.

Medvedev ran for office with an air of supreme confidence. He refused to take part in televised debates and made few speeches, limiting himself to choreographed appearances before groups of workers, pensioners, and war veterans. He refused to take part in televised debates and made few speeches, limiting himself to choreographed appearances before groups of workers, pensioners, and war veterans.

At a meeting of the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States,or CIS (an alliance of 11 former Soviet Republics) that took place in February, Putin introduced Medvedev to the other heads of states as if he had already been elected.
One of the reasons for Medvedev's victory was the success of the authorities in making sure that Medvedev faced no genuine opposition. The former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov was barred from participating in the election on the grounds that 13 percent of the more than two million signatures he collected in order to qualify were invalid. Independent observers believe that the true figure was closer to three per cent and that Kasyanov was kept off the ballot in order to prevent any real debate on the political issues facing the country.
The most important reason for Medvedev's victory, however, was that he had the support of Putin. In the years of Putin's presidency, Russian GDP per head rose from $2,000 in 1998 to $9,000 at current rates of exchange. Persons accustomed to regarding Russia as a poor country were obliged to revise their evaluation as Moscow, St. Petersburg and even provincial cities experienced a consumer boom. After years of nightmarish hardship under Yeltsin during which Russian workers did not receive their salaries for months or even years and were obliged to grow their own food, the relative prosperity under Putin was a welcome relief and contributed to his huge popularity. Putin's behavior in a whole series of crises, the sinking of the submarine Kursk, the hostage taking at the Theater on Dubrovka in Moscow and the Beslan school siege would have totally discredited the leader of a Western country. But all this was overlooked in the face of the dramatically improved economic situation.
Medvedev, despite his high posts-he was also deputy prime minister - was little known to Russians except as a protege of Putin's. Under the circumstances, the vote for Medvedev was nothing as much as the expression of a deep desire for the good times under Putin to continue.

Medvedev and Putin were jubilant in the wake of the election results and Medvedev promised to continue Putin's policies. Ironically, during the election campaign, the only serious statement of long-term policy goals for Russia was issued not by Medvedev but by Putin.
Despite the Kremlin-supported victory, however, the atmosphere in Moscow in the aftermath of the election was unsettled. Russians were aware that they had elected a president without being presented with a real alternative. The capital was rife with rumors of monetary reform that would lead to a big increase in inflation. There was also talk of an impending default and serious conflicts over property and power between factions in the government. Mikhail Delyagin, the head of the Institute of Globalization, said, "The stability of Russian society is hanging by a thread."
The problem is "dual power" has been installed in Russia.  Medvedev has been elected president with Putin's support but there is a widespread assumption that, in reality, Putin will continue to rule.
The presidential election was preceded by parliamentary elections in December in which Putin headed up the list of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party. Formally, Putin is not a member of the United Russia party but under Russian law, he can be included as a party candidate.. In the run-up to the election, Russian voters were urged to give a vote of confidence to Putin as "national leader." There was no explanation, however, of what this would mean. Russians were asked, in effect, to give Putin a blank check. Astonishingly, from a Western point of view, they agreed.
The result of the elections was an overwhelming victory for United Russia and for Putin followed by Putin's endorsement of Medvedev for the post of president and Medvedev's statement that, if elected president, he wanted to appoint Putin as prime minister. Putin had apparently put in place a president who would carry out his policies making it possible for him to continue to rule without appearing to violate the Constitution by seeking a third term.
The problem with this arrangement is that it is inherently unstable, particularly in Russia, where there is bad historical experience with dual power. It was the division of power between the provisional government and the revolutionary councils (or "soviets") that facilitated the Bolshevik seizure of power under the seemingly democratic slogan of "All Power to the Soviets." In 1993, the struggle for power between Yeltsin and the Russian parliament, the Supreme Soviet, under Yeltsin's erstwhile allies, Ruslan Khasbulatov and Alexander Rutskoi, was settled with a massacre at the Ostankino television tower and attack with tanks on the Supreme Soviet building.
In the present situation, both Medvedev and Putin have stated that if Putin becomes prime minister, there will be no diminution in presidential powers. Russia, however, is a hyper-presidential system. The president appoints the prime minister and can fire him at any time. The appointment of a prime minister must be confirmed by the State Duma, but if the Duma refuses three candidates for the post of prime minister in succession, the president can dissolve the Duma.
The president is responsible for foreign policy and the broad outlines of social and economic policy. He is considered the guarantor of the Constitution. He appoints all ministers and all governors. He also appoints the justices of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The presidential administration is also in charge of oil exports, giving it control over billions of dollars in cash flows.
Under these circumstances, Russia does not even need a prime minister whose role is, at best, to carry out purely administrative functions on behalf of the president. It is therefore difficult to imagine that Putin will accept the role of prime minister as it is traditionally envisaged. Any attempt to broaden the role of the prime minister or to rule the country with the help of informal ties, however, will only undermine further the limited constitutionality and respect for law that still exists.
During his eight years in office, Putin succeeded in eliminating independent centers of power in Russia. National television is heavily censored. The courts are controlled. NGO's are suppressed and business is subservient to the regime with businessmen quite aware that the price for political independence can be prosecution on charges of corruption.
The rise of a system in which the bureaucracy rules alone means that conflicts cannot be regulated except by those at the very top of the power pyramid. For a long time, the person at the top was Putin. Now, formally, it will be Medvedev but with Putin, presumably, pulling the strings from his post as prime minister. This arrangement inevitably raises fears of future instability.